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Abstract 
In 1955, Milton Friedman authored a foundational paper proposing a shift in funding and governance 
mechanisms for public K -12   schools, suggesting that parents be awarded tuition vouchers that they 
could use to pay for private sector education services for their children, rather than relying   on   
government   provided   neighborhood   schools.   Friedman theorized three cases in which such a system 
might fail, requiring greater involvement of the government in the education system: the presence of a 
natural monopoly; substantial neighborhood effects; and a breakdown in free exchange. This article 
examines these concerns by applying more than 25 years of school choice research in an attempt to 
answer the question, “ After 60 years, do the arguments for K-12 vouchers still hold?” Findings cited in 
this article suggest that Friedman was correct to be concerned about possible deleterious effects that may 
arise from a privatized system. 
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Introduction 
Tuition voucher programs have been in place in 
the United States since the mid-1800s. Both 
Vermont and Maine have programs in place that 
offer families tuition vouchers to use at public or 
private non-parochial schools, if they live in a 
locality that has no available public schools. In 
1955 (and again in a 1962 revision), Milton 
Friedman put forth a more modern proposal to 
expand such programs and bring the power of 
the market to bear on the public school system.1  
His proposal launched what would become an 
ongoing effort to reform and privatize the public 
school system in states across the United States. 
As of 2013, 18 states and the District of 
Columbia had some form of publicly funded 
tuition voucher (or tax credit) system in place 
(American Federation for Children, 2013). The 
shift of Congressional control to Republicans as 
of 2015 has re-energized efforts to expand choice 
programs within those and other states (Sen. 
Tim Scott Discusses School Choice, 2015; 
Layton, 2014; Republican National Committee, 
undated). Before substantially increasing efforts 
to privatize public schools, it is worth reflecting 
on the theoretical foundation for the school 
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 choice movement, using research findings to 
examine the outcomes of the movement thus far.  
When he proposed tuition vouchers in 
1955, Friedman mapped out a careful series of 
conditions under which government should take 
responsibility for using tax money to pay for a 
system of public schools. After establishing a 
compelling interest for government support of a 
public system, he next considered whether it was 
necessary for government to also run the 
schools, or whether the government could 
instead fund a program that would funnel public 
funds through parents to pay for a system of 
privately operated schools. After concluding that 
such a system would indeed be feasible (and 
desirable) he explained specific market failures 
that might require government intervention in 
the education sector—outcomes that could create 
a compelling need for a stronger government 
role in the management of schools. At the time, 
Friedman dismissed these potential outcomes as 
unlikely, but held open the possibility that such 
evidence might arise once programs were put in 
place. 
Voucher programs (like those envisaged by 
Friedman) have now been in place in the United 
States for over 20 years. While these programs 
have largely been local in nature, or limited to 
specific populations (e.g., high poverty or special 
needs students), other countries (such as Chile 
and Sweden) have well-established national 
programs. In addition, a number of other market-
oriented reforms have been created based on 
Friedman’s initial supposition that governments 
should fund, but not administer, schools. For the 
purposes of this paper, such programs also include 
charter schools.  
Charter schools are government-funded 
schools that are “chartered” to deliver educational 
programs independent of public school 
administrative structures. Charter schools may be 
run individually (so-called “mom and pop” schools), 
or by large scale providers—Educational 
Management Organizations (EMOs). These 
programs (in the U.S. and internationally) have 
generated significant bodies of research that can 
allow us to revisit Friedman’s 1955 proposal, 
examine the system he envisioned, and apply 
research findings to the concerns he dismissed at 
the time. 
 
Context 
In his 1955 article, “The Role of Government in 
Education,” Friedman presented the case for 
public education, and then described the role 
that government should play in such a system. 
He defined, generally, the reason for government 
involvement in any economic activity, and 
identified three special cases where government 
involvement is justified: the presence of a 
monopoly; neighborhood effects; and 
paternalism (who should make the educational 
choices for children). In 1955, he determined 
that these situations were not a substantial risk. 
Seven years later, without explanation, he 
reduced these three cases to only two by 
dropping concerns related to natural monopoly 
in a revised version of the article (Friedman, 
1962), although he did speak to “technical 
monopoly” in much the same way.  
I have chosen to focus on Friedman’s 
original 1955 work primarily because he never 
addressed why he dropped “natural monopoly” 
from his list of concerns. Additionally, even in 
the revised version, Friedman discussed the 
problem of “technical monopoly,” suggesting 
that whether one calls it a natural or technical 
monopoly, the presence of a monopoly is a 
concern that government should address. 
Finally, in searches of scholarly research 
databases, Friedman’s 1955 article is much more 
frequently cited, suggesting it serves as the 
foundational article on school choice as far as 
the research community is concerned. 
In the article, Friedman “takes freedom of 
the individual, or more realistically the family, as 
[society’s] ultimate objective, and seeks to 
further this objective by relying primarily on 
voluntary exchange among individuals for the 
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organization of economic activity.” As such, 
“government's primary role is to preserve the 
rules of the game by enforcing contracts, 
preventing coercion, and keeping markets free.” 
(p. 124). While these are the ground rules put 
forth by Friedman (and other market theorists), 
he also noted that there are at times 
justifications for greater government 
involvement in organizing economic activity. 
 
Education for Citizenship 
An important piece of Friedman’s work--one that 
is frequently either overlooked or ignored, 
perhaps due to its simplicity--is his definition of 
the purpose of public education. He noted that, 
“A stable and democratic society is impossible 
without widespread acceptance of some common 
set of values and without a minimum degree of 
literacy and knowledge on the part of most 
citizens” (p. 124-25). As such, he identified two 
important principles of public education: 
introduction to a common set of values, and a 
minimum degree of literacy and knowledge. This 
goal of a citizenry with a common set of values 
and basic level of literacy and knowledge 
remains central to his proposal, in particular 
stemming from his discussion of neighborhood 
effects, but also important when considering the 
“paternalistic concern for children” (discussed 
below). 
 
Government Intervention in 
Economic Activity 
According to Friedman, there are only three 
major grounds on which government 
intervention in economic activity could be 
justified (1955), and all three stem from actions 
that restrict voluntary exchange among 
individuals. The first is the presence of a 
monopoly or another market imperfection that 
would prohibit the voluntary exchange required 
for market competition. The second is the 
existence of neighborhood effects. The final 
reason for government involvement would be 
limits to free exchange caused by a lack of clarity 
regarding the objectives of the public schools. 
Neighborhood effects result when “the 
action of one individual imposes significant costs 
on other individuals for which it is not feasible to 
make him compensate them or yields significant 
gains to them for which it is not feasible to make 
them compensate him” (p. 124). Essentially, it is 
impossible to quantify or obtain remuneration 
for the value individuals receive from the social 
stability that results from a commonly educated 
citizenry.  
Free exchange may be limited by 
“ambiguity in the ultimate objective,” what 
Friedman calls a ”paternalistic concern for 
children and other irresponsible individuals” (p. 
124)—in other words, the ability of the chooser 
to select a school or curriculum that will achieve 
the purposes of public education: an individual 
educated in a common set of values to at least 
minimum academic standards. Therefore, if 
within public education there is a monopoly, 
substantial neighborhood effects, or challenges 
achieving the public purposes, then according to 
Friedman increased government involvement 
can be justified to address these conditions. 
 
Monopoly 
A monopoly exists where voluntary exchange is 
limited by the lack of provider options. This may 
be due to geographic challenges or the expense of 
starting a new business. Utilities are frequently 
used as an example, since (for example) creating 
parallel infrastructure for delivery of electricity 
would be both unwieldy and expensive, naturally 
limiting the number of potential providers. As 
Friedman noted, in rural communities, the 
number of potential customers may be too small 
to make the presence of multiple providers 
economically viable. The choices in such cases, 
according to Friedman, would be unregulated 
private monopoly, state controlled private 
monopoly, or public operation. 
Interestingly, Friedman’s solution to this 
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problem was to suggest a hybrid approach: that 
the monopoly is allowed to exist, but that 
vouchers are provided to allow competition to 
arise where providers see a market. As he noted, 
“governments would continue to administer 
some schools but parents who chose to send 
their children to other schools would be paid a 
sum equal to the estimated cost of educating a 
child in a government school, provided that at 
least this sum was spent on education in an 
approved school” (p. 130). 
Two related questions then arise. First, 
where privatization has occurred, would public 
funding eventually lead to a return to 
government involvement? In other words, in 
privatized delivery systems, would the function 
of the government as the funder ultimately lead 
to re-regulation of the private sector, losing the 
competitive benefits choice advocates theorize as 
the primary justification for privatization? 
Second, within the concept of a monopoly, there 
is another force at play that isn’t specifically 
addressed by Friedman, but still may influence 
the behavior of the system. In education, the 
consumer is compelled by the state to access the 
education services offered by the state (or other 
providers). In such a case, the way in which the 
market system in the competitive arena evolves 
may differ from that of a typical market 
economy. 
 
What The Research Says 
How Do The Market and System Evolve? 
The two questions that arise from the challenge 
Friedman presented are: 1) In systems where the 
market has been opened, does the market 
respond by providing substantial new options; 
and 2) If the market does respond as theorized, 
how does the system evolve? 
There is evidence to suggest an increase in 
the number of private schools over the past two 
decades. In 1989 there were 26,712 private 
schools in the United States, expanding to 
28,996 as of 2006 (US Department of 
Education, 2006). While central cities and rural 
areas saw declines in numbers, there was 
substantial growth in urban areas (from 7903 to 
11,775). Similarly, while the number of religious 
schools expanded by just 0.7%, the number of 
nonsectarian schools grew by 44%. Interestingly, 
the number of students enrolled in private 
schools increased only slightly between 1990 and 
2006, and by 2009 total enrollment had actually 
declined overall (US Department of Education, 
2012).  
School choice options also include more 
than attendance at private schools--in the United 
States many parents (depending on locality) can 
choose to enroll their children in charter schools, 
magnet schools, or other public schools outside 
of their catchment area. Research suggests that 
these options also expanded considerably in the 
1990s and early 2000s (Bielick & Chapman, 
2003; Linkow, 2011). The proliferation of school 
choice options over the past twenty years 
suggests that at least part of the Friedman’s 
theory—that the market will respond to demand 
if consumer choice is expanded—is supported; 
however, Friedman’s concern that choice will not 
expand in geographically isolated and rural areas 
is also supported by research (US Department of 
Education, 2006). 
Legislators are still working to change 
school funding systems, making it difficult to 
state with any confidence if the expansion in 
options is sustainable or simply a short- term 
response to recent policy changes. That said, 
there is some data collected that suggests some 
of these choice options may eventually be 
consolidated under corporate and nonprofit 
management organizations, ultimately limiting 
choice and potentially leading to the presence of 
private monopolies in some areas. 
For the past 13 years researchers have 
been collecting data on for-profit and not- for-
profit Educational Management Organizations 
(Miron, et al., 2001). EMOs manage one or more 
schools within the choice sector and range from 
organizations focused on individual schools to 
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large conglomerates (such as Mott MacDonald) 
and publicly traded publishing houses (such as 
Pearson, PLC). Currently 35% of all charter 
schools are run by EMOs, enrolling 42% of all 
charter school students. Large EMOs manage the 
bulk of for-profit charter schools (70.7% are 
operated by 14 large EMOs) while 79% of non- 
profit charter schools are run by large or 
medium sized EMOs. In the voucher sector, 
there is research to suggest that small private 
schools are more likely to fail than larger schools 
(Ford, 2011), adding to concerns about how the 
market might ultimately respond to privatization 
of education services. It will be interesting to see 
how the sector grows and consolidates over time, 
and if the concept of multiple providers is 
sustainable. 
Similarly, the legislative framework under 
which these schools run changes as political 
changes bring in new policy priorities.  Schools 
participating in choice programs frequently 
experience shifting requirements regarding 
accountability, funding, student eligibility and 
data reporting, and some programs, such as the 
one in Milwaukee Wisconsin, have seen a return 
to greater government regulation as they evolve 
(Rubelen, 2006). 
 
Neighborhood Effects 
Friedman makes a strong case for the public 
funding of education, noting that a stable and 
democratic society requires that citizens have a 
set of shared values and a basic level of literacy 
and knowledge. He notes that because of this, 
the education of each child also benefits the 
broader society, contributing to the welfare of 
others even though the contribution cannot be 
quantified. This, he noted, results in substantial 
neighborhood effects in as far as educational 
outcomes vary across localities. 
To compensate for these neighborhood 
effects, Friedman suggested requiring a common 
curriculum, through the provision of public 
education. Rather than requiring parents to pay 
for this education (something he is sympathetic 
to but rejects as not feasible given differences in 
family sizes and resources), Friedman argued 
that education is a valid function of government. 
While he uses neighborhood effects to justify 
imposition of both a common curriculum and 
public funding, he breaks with the current 
system by suggesting that public funding does 
not by definition require public management--in 
other words, governments should be able to fund 
educational institutions though provision of 
tuition vouchers to parents for use at the 
institutions of their choice, as long as “schools 
met certain minimum standards such as the 
inclusion of a minimum common content in 
their programs” (p. 127). 
 “One argument from the ‘neighborhood 
effect’ for nationalizing education, according to 
Friedman, is that it might otherwise be 
impossible to provide the common core of values 
deemed requisite for social stability” (p. 128). He 
continued, “Schools run by different religious 
groups will, it can be argued, instill sets of values 
that are inconsistent with one an other and with 
those instilled in other schools; in this way they 
convert education into a divisive rather than a 
unifying force” and that, “the link between the 
financing of education and its administration 
places other [private] schools at a disadvantage: 
they get the benefit of little or none of the 
governmental funds spent on education;” 
however, “elimination of this disadvantage 
might...strengthen the parochial schools and so 
render the problem of achieving a common core 
of values even more difficult.” (p. 128). 
A final point raised by Friedman regarding 
the potential negative outcomes resulting from 
neighborhood effects is that of exacerbated class 
distinctions, i.e., when given choices, parents 
would choose to send their children to school 
with children from similar backgrounds, 
reducing the “healthy intermingling of children 
from decidedly different backgrounds” (p. 129). 
Even in 1955, Friedman was aware of the 
potential for a voucher system to be used to 
maintain class and ethnic distinctions. In a 
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lengthy note within the chapter he discussed the 
move by some localities in the southern United 
States to use vouchers as a means for 
maintaining a segregated school system. While 
he noted that he initially thought this was a mark 
against his proposal, after further reflection he 
maintained that the importance of freedom to 
choose trumped the integration of schools. He 
stated, “Under [a choice] system, there can 
develop exclusively white schools, exclusively 
colored schools, and mixed schools. Parents can 
choose which to send their children to. The 
appropriate activity for those who oppose 
segregation and racial prejudice is to try to 
persuade others of their views; if and as they 
succeed, the mixed schools will grow at the 
expense of the non-mixed, and a gradual 
transition will take place.” (pg. 131).  
A full critique of Friedman’s view that 
segregated schools are acceptable, and his 
general view that market economies are 
colorblind (Friedman, 1962) is beyond the scope 
of this article, but is highly contested in both law 
(Brown v. Board of Education, 1954) and 
education scholarship (Coleman et al., 1962; 
Laitsch & Rodi, 2004; Wells, 2014). For the 
purposes of this article, I focus on his emphasis 
that government administration of the schools 
may be required if research suggests that 
neighborhood effects are exacerbating class 
distinctions that serve to break down the 
“common core of values deemed requisite for 
social stability” (p. 128). Further, the research 
cited here includes the impact of market choice 
on class and racial segregation to test 
Friedman’s assumption that “The widening of 
the range of choice under a private system would 
operate to reduce both kinds of stratification” 
(p.129). If research shows that privatization 
serves to exacerbate economic and racial 
segregation, then it may be appropriate for 
government to intervene. 
 
Economic and Racial Stratification  
Research regarding economic and racial 
stratification is available for some forms of large-
scale school choice in the U.S. (specifically 
charters and open enrollment). The available 
research suggests that choice programs in the 
U.S. do generally result in greater economic and 
ethnic stratification (Ben-Porath, 2012; Bifulco, 
Ladd & Ross, 2008; d’Entremont, & Gulosino, 
2008; Garcia, 2008; Jacobs, 2013; Koedel, Betts, 
Rice, & Zau, 2010; Mickelson, Bottia, & 
Southworth, 2008). This trend is supported by 
research in other countries, where vouchers are 
much more widely used and firmly entrenched in 
the educational system (Levin, 1998). Research 
on Chile’s voucher system has found that the 
voucher systems has exacerbated inequities, with 
public schools serving more disadvantaged, low-
income, and indigenous students than private 
voucher schools (Elacqua, 2009; Elacqua, & de 
Gobierno, 2006; González, Mizala, & 
Romaguera, 2004). Additionally, within Chilean 
voucher schools there is further stratification 
linked to differences in tuition levels (Elacqua, 
2009; Elacqua, & de Gobierno, 2006). Recent 
research looking at outcomes in Sweden has also 
found that choice policies resulted in a large 
increase in social and economic stratification 
(Söderström & Uusitalo, 2010; Wiborg, 2008).  
 
Free Exchange and Paternalistic Concern 
While Friedman identified the concept of 
“paternalistic concern for children” as 
important, he spent little time in his essay 
discussing the problem or the solution. He noted 
that, “The third [challenge] derives from an 
ambiguity in the ultimate objective rather than 
from the difficulty of achieving it by voluntary 
exchange, namely, paternalistic concern for 
children and other irresponsible individuals.” (p. 
124). In other words, the primary beneficiaries 
of education are not able to exercise voluntary 
exchange in a manner that accomplishes the 
goals of public education. Friedman turns to 
parents as the primary caregivers and identifies 
them as the individuals who should be allowed to 
exercise choice on behalf of their children, 
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although he acknowledges that “such a 
procedure rests on expediency rather than 
principle. The problem of drawing a reasonable 
line between action justified on these 
paternalistic grounds and action that conflicts 
with the freedom of responsible individuals is 
clearly one to which no satisfactory answer can 
be given.” (p. 124). 
This doesn’t mean that this issue 
disappears, however, or that there isn’t research 
that we can use to interrogate the problem. If as 
Friedman has identified, the primary purpose of 
the public schools is to establish a citizenry with 
a common set of values, a basic level of literacy, 
and understanding of a specific body of 
knowledge, then the choices made by consumers 
in a market based system can be evaluated with 
regard to their impact on these outcome goals. In 
other words, do parents choose schools that will 
further Friedman’s stated goals of literacy, 
common curriculum, and citizenship, or do they 
have other reasons for choosing their child’s 
school? A major cornerstone of market theory is 
that consumers have access to the information 
that will allow them to make the “best” choices. 
In this case, do parents have access to enough 
information about the schools they are choosing 
to make the best choice? 
 
Social Outcomes 
Looking into the research on social outcomes 
associated with the use of private school 
vouchers results in a complex picture. This is 
particularly true in that many programs are 
designed to target specific groups of people, 
encouraging them to make choices they might 
not otherwise make. Even so, we can get a 
general sense of the stated and observed 
behaviors of families who choose schools. While 
research shows that parents are generally more 
satisfied with their choice in school (Wolf, 
2008), it also suggests that parents are likely to 
choose the schools for other than academic 
reasons, including religious affiliation 
(Denessen, Driessena & Sleegers, 2005; Fleming, 
Cowen, Witte, & Wolf, 2014; Ji & Boyatt, 2007), 
social class and race (Lacireno-Paquet & 
Brantley, 2008). Other research finds that while 
most parents state that they choose schools for 
academic reasons, their observed behavior is that 
they chose schools based on peer composition in 
terms of race and class (Lacireno-Paquet & 
Brantley, 2008; Wells, 2014). In effect, parents 
don’t choose for societal gain, but  for personal 
gain, suggesting Friedman’s concern—that 
privatization will lead to increased 
fragmentation of society—may indeed be true. 
When looking at the type of information 
available to parents making school choices, there 
is no standard data reporting system for school 
characteristics or achievement information, 
particularly with regard to private schools (and 
charter schools). In many cases, parents rely on 
informal networks or the advertising and 
marketing materials provided by schools. 
Research looking at the issue of charter schools, 
in one urban area, has found that these schools 
tended to present information to parents that 
targeted particular student groups, again further 
fragmenting schools (Wilson, Carlsen, & Rivera, 
2015). Other research suggests that parent 
access to quality information varies by ethnicity 
and income, and that their choice varies based 
on the type of information they are able to access 
(Yettick, 2014). Finally, research in Sweden 
found very little standardized information (or 
even academic information) in school 
informational material (Johnsson & Lindgrin, 
2010).  
 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
This article is not intended to provide a definitive 
review of school choice research, nor is it 
intended to argue the veracity of the arguments 
Friedman put forth in his foundational essay. 
Rather, the goal was to apply the available body 
of research to the specific concerns raised in that 
essay. When Friedman made his proposal to 
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shift management of public schools from the 
public sector to the private he identified three 
challenges that could prove detrimental to such a 
shift: the presence of a monopoly that prevents 
choice; the presence of substantial neighborhood 
effects that work to break down the common 
educational experience needed for to support a 
stable and democratic society; and the inability 
of the consumer (students) to fully exercise 
voluntary exchange. 
While not definitive, research suggests that 
there are substantial concerns in each of these 
areas, suggesting that the move to a privatized 
system may ultimately harm the public purposes 
of education as outlined by Friedman. In 
particular, there are important challenges 
regarding the societal fragmentation along 
economic and ethnic lines, and the presence of a 
monopoly—particularly if the trend toward 
consolidation of privatized educational services 
through EMOs continues. A major purpose for 
shifting to a privately run system was to expand 
choice and competition by increasing the 
number of providers and decreasing the amount 
of governmental oversight, management and 
regulation. Early findings from the recent 
expansion in education choice in the United 
States suggests that while options have expanded 
over the past 20 years, there may be underlying 
trends in corporate consolidation that may work 
against the initial diversity in options over the 
longer term. 
Advocates of expanded school choice 
should think carefully about the design of the 
programs they propose. In the past, concerns 
largely focused on empowering the choice of 
participants, and not the outcomes of that 
choice. The research highlighted here, and the 
concerns raised by the foundational work of 
Milton Friedman, suggest that choice advocates 
need to also consider the outcomes of choice 
programs, and take seriously concerns related to 
the weakening of the broader public purposes of 
education. 
 
Notes 
1. Friedman’s chapter focuses on both general 
education and vocational education, with 
vocational education serving as the branching 
off point for a discussion related to higher 
education. The current article only looks at 
Friedman’s arguments as they pertain to 
governance of the K-12 system. 
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